Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII: The Promising Road Ahead by Wright, Sydney
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Volume 52 Number 1 Article 4 
Summer 9-1-2018 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII: The Promising 
Road Ahead 
Sydney Wright 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sydney Wright, Comment, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII: The Promising Road Ahead, 
52 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 93 (2018). 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola 
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
(9)52.1_WRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019 9:53 PM 
 
93 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER TITLE VII: THE PROMISING ROAD 
AHEAD 
Sydney Wright* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean to discriminate against an individual on the 
basis of that individual’s sex? Title VII prohibits an employer from 
“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”1 And since 
its adoption in 1964, litigants have, in one way or another, repeatedly 
posed this question for courts to determine. 
While most courts historically have held that “sex” does not in-
clude sexual orientation2—meaning an action against an employer for 
discriminating against a homosexual employee is not legally cogniza-
ble under Title VII—in recent years following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 courts have reconsidered 
the logic behind such a determination. 
Perhaps, sexual orientation discrimination is in fact discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex insofar as the crux of homosexuality is a sexual 
relationship between two people of the same gender. In other words, 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Anthropology and 
Political Science, University of California, Irvine, 2016. Thanks to Professor Robert Brain for his 
feedback and guidance throughout the writing process, to the members of Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review for their hard work, and to my family and friends for their unrelenting support. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 2. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income 
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 
(9th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Hamner v. 
St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (abrogated on other grounds); 
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 3. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing discrimination based on gender stereotyping or gender 
non-conformity as legally cognizable sex-based discrimination). 
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as one scholar frames the argument, “[t]he discharge of a male em-
ployee because he has a male lover is an action that would not be taken 
against a similarly situated female employee.”4 
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit recently held in Evans v. Geor-
gia Regional Hospital5  that discrimination based on sexual orientation 
is not actionable under Title VII.6 In a strongly worded dissent, Circuit 
Judge Rosenbaum explained why the majority’s and concurrence’s de-
cision rests on unsettled ground at best.7 This Comment will explore 
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Evans and discuss 
why the dissent’s view is more consistent with the evolution of the law 
and is likewise gaining momentum in other circuits. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the facts and procedural his-
tory of Evans. In Part III, we will take an in-depth look at the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions in Evans, as they are fairly em-
blematic of the various emerging theoretical approaches to sexual ori-
entation discrimination under Title VII. Part IV will discuss the his-
torical framework of sex discrimination under Title VII, particularly 
the Supreme Court cases that have carved a path for recognizing sex-
ual orientation discrimination as actionable under Title VII. 
Finally, Part V will explain why it seems the dissent in Evans got 
it right, or at the very least why the dissent’s point of view is gaining 
momentum as other courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) hold that sexual orientation discrimination is ac-
tionable under Title VII. Part VI will also briefly discuss how a Title 
VII sexual orientation discrimination case might fare in the Supreme 
Court. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Facts 
From August 1, 2012 to October 11, 2013, Jameka Evans worked 
at Georgia Regional Hospital as a security officer.8 Evans is a lesbian 
woman who “identifie[s] with the male gender.”9 During her tenure at 
 
 4. Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1992). 
 5. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1261–73 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 1250–51 (majority opinion). 
 9. Id. 
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the hospital, Evans claimed that as a result of her non-conformity to 
her male boss’s gender stereotypes, namely her sexual orientation and 
outwardly masculine appearance, “she was denied equal pay or work, 
harassed, and physically assaulted or battered.”10 
Evans alleged that her boss conspired to terminate her by “making 
her employment unbearable,” insofar as he promoted a less qualified 
individual to be her direct supervisor, and he repeatedly closed a door 
on her “in a rude manner.”11 Additionally, she “experienced schedul-
ing issues and a shift change” as well as harassment from her new 
supervisor and tampering with her equipment.12 Finally, Evans claims 
that when she lodged a complaint against her employers to Human 
Resources, the Human Resources Manager asked her about her sexu-
ality—indicating to Evans that her sexuality may have been the basis 
of the discriminatory treatment she received.13 
B.  Procedural History 
Evans, as a pro se litigant, brought suit against her employer for 
the alleged discrimination based on her status as a lesbian woman and 
gender non-conformity, as well as a claim for retaliation in violation 
of Title VII.14 With respect to Evans’s claims of discrimination based 
on her sexual orientation and gender non-conformity—the claims at 
the focus of this Comment—a magistrate judge found: Title VII “was 
not intended to cover discrimination against homosexuals.”15 With re-
gard to Evans’s claim of discrimination based on gender non-conform-
ity, the magistrate judge concluded that it was “just another way to 
claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,” no matter how it 
was otherwise characterized.16 
The magistrate judge recommended dismissing all of Evans’s 
claims with prejudice.17 Evans timely objected to the magistrate 
judge’s report and recommendation, with the support of an amicus cu-
riae brief filed by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1248. 
 15. Id. at 1252. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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(“Lambda”).18 The District Court for the Southern District of Georgia 
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation without 
further comment, and appointed counsel from Lambda to represent 
Evans on appeal.19 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismis-
sal of Evans’s gender non-conformity claim and remanded “with in-
structions to grant Evans leave to amend such claim.”20 The court af-
firmed, however, that sexual orientation discrimination is not 
actionable under Title VII, and consequently affirmed the dismissal of 
Evans’s claim of discrimination due to her status as a lesbian woman.21 
Circuit Judge William Pryor concurred with the majority, while Cir-
cuit Judge Rosenbaum dissented.22 Furthermore, Evans filed a petition 
for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied.23 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  Majority Opinion 
 The majority first addressed whether alleged discrimination 
based on gender non-conformity is actionable under Title VII, or “just 
another way to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation.”24 It 
held that it is in fact actionable, pointing to the Eleventh Circuit’s hold-
ing in Glenn v. Brumby.25 The court in Glenn, relying on Price Water-
house, held that discrimination against a transgender individual on the 
basis of that individual’s failure to conform to a gender stereotype is 
sex-based discrimination actionable under Title VII.26 
The court found that Evans “did not provide enough factual mat-
ter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present herself in a mascu-
line manner led to the alleged adverse employment actions.”27 How-
ever, because pro se litigants should generally be allowed to amend 
 
 18. Id.; see also Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, 
Inc. in Support of Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, Evans v. Ga. 
Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. CV415-103). 
 19. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1253. 
 20. Id. at 1255. 
 21. Id. at 1257. 
 22. Id. at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring), 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
 23. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l 
Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (mem.). 
 24. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254. 
 25. Id. at 1254–55 (citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)). 
 26. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316. 
 27. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254. 
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complaints, and an attempt to do so by Evans could not be deemed 
futile, the court remanded Evans’s gender non-conformity claim, with 
instructions to allow her to amend her complaint.28 
The court then addressed whether a plaintiff may sustain a claim 
of discrimination based on sexual orientation under Title VII.29 The 
court relied on Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,30 which held that “[d]ischarge 
for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”31 The court disa-
greed that the Supreme Court decisions in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.32 support claims 
for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.33 The court rea-
soned that neither case’s holding “squarely address[ed] whether sex-
ual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII.”34 
Finally, the court bolstered its holding by citing cases from nearly 
all other circuits supporting the proposition that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is not actionable under Title VII.35 Not a single supporting 
case cited, however, was decided after 2006.36 Furthermore, the court 
refused to address whether the decisions it cited from other circuits 
were inconsistent with Price Waterhouse or Oncale as Evans and the 
EEOC as amicus curiae argued. It instead maintained that Blum con-
trolled its decision, and as such, it was bound to affirm the district 
court’s dismissal of Evans’s sexual orientation claim.37 
B.  Judge Pryor’s Concurrence 
The concurrence basically sets forth two main arguments. The 
first is that sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination based 
on gender nonconformity are “legally distinct” concepts, and as such, 
 
 28. Id. at 1254–55. 
 29. Id. at 1255. 
 30.  597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 31. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Blum, 597 F.2d at 938); see also Bonner v. City of 
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e choose the decisions of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down 
by that court prior to the close of business on that date,” as binding precedent in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.). 
 32. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII). 
 33. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 1257. 
(9)52.1_WRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2019  9:53 PM 
98 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:93 
the former does not necessarily constitute the latter.38 The second sets 
forth general disdain for the dissent’s arguments and asserts that if 
sexual orientation discrimination ought to be covered by Title VII, it 
is up to the legislature to explicitly make it so.39 
1.  Sexual Orientation Discrimination and Discrimination Based on 
Gender Nonconformity Are Legally Distinct 
The concurrence asserts that although sexual orientation discrim-
ination and discrimination based on gender nonconformity may over-
lap considerably, any notion that the former always constitutes the lat-
ter “relies on false stereotypes of gay individuals.”40 Judge Pryor 
disputes the idea that “all gay individuals necessarily engage in the 
same behavior.”41 In apparent defense of gay individuals, Judge Pryor 
dives into a discussion of the spectrum of sexual identities which gay 
individuals “adopt,” and accuses the dissent and the EEOC of “stere-
otyp[ing] all gay individuals in the same way that the Commission and 
dissent allege that the Hospital stereotyped Evans.”42 
Ultimately, however, his argument amounts to a distinction be-
tween status and behavior. Judge Pryor asserts that an employee who 
has experienced discrimination based on sexual orientation can have a 
legally cognizable gender-nonconformity claim only if he or she can 
prove the discriminatory action was taken because of the employee’s 
nonconforming behavior, and not solely because of his or her noncon-
forming status as a gay individual.43 Judge Pryor maintains that the 
latter is merely an “invention” by the dissent without precedential sup-
port.44 
2.  Even if the Dissent Were Right, It Is Up to the Legislature to Give 
Legal Effect to the Dissent’s Arguments. 
Judge Pryor further inflates this distinction between status and 
behavior by arguing that “a status-based [inquiry] does more than mis-
read precedent; it also does violence to the relationship between the 
 
 38. Id. at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 1260–61. 
 40. Id. at 1258. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1259. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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doctrine [of gender nonconformity] and the enumerated classes of Ti-
tle VII.”45 He explains, “The doctrine of gender nonconformity is not 
an independent vehicle for relief; it is instead a proxy a plaintiff uses 
to help support [the] argument that an employer discriminated on the 
basis of the enumerated sex category . . . .”46 
He reiterates that the gender nonconformity doctrine is behavior-
based, and as such, “[s]tatus-based protections must stem from a sep-
arate doctrine or directly from the text of Title VII.”47 Judge Pryor 
concludes with a reminder for the dissent that the job of the court is to 
declare what the law is, not what it should be.48 Therefore, Judge Pryor 
asserts, the dissent’s arguments are best raised “before Congress, not 
this Court.”49 
C.  Judge Rosenbaum’s Dissent 
Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent begins with a reiteration of the hold-
ing in Price Waterhouse: “Title VII precludes discrimination on the 
basis of every stereotype of what a woman supposedly should 
be . . . .”50 He explains that Price Waterhouse “necessarily abrogated” 
the holding in Blum on which the majority relied.51 He asserts that “it 
is utter fiction” to find a woman discriminated against because she is 
lesbian “was not discriminated against for failing to comport with her 
employer’s stereotyped view of women.”52 Because such discrimina-
tion is explicitly proscribed by Price Waterhouse, Judge Rosenbaum 
would find sexual orientation discrimination actionable under Title 
VII.53 
Judge Rosenbaum continues to discuss the impact of Price Wa-
terhouse on Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence. He notes the 
Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in Glenn in which the Court 
relied on Price Waterhouse to apply the “prescriptive-stereotyping 
theory to hold that discrimination against a transgender employee 
merely because the employee fails to conform to the employer’s view 
 
 45. Id. at 1260. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1261. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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of what a member of the employee’s birth-assigned sex should be vi-
olates Title VII.”54 
The dissent criticizes the majority and concurrence for departing 
from Glenn. He reasons, 
By definition, a gay employee is sexually attracted to mem-
bers of her own sex. So when an employer discriminates 
against an employee solely because she is a lesbian, the em-
ployer acts against the employee only because she is sexually 
attracted to women, instead of being attracted to only men, 
like the employer prescriptively believes women should be.55 
Judge Rosenbaum laments the concurrence’s and the majority’s 
re-characterization of sexual orientation in contradiction of their own 
reasoning in Glenn. He refers to the concurrence’s behavior-status dis-
tinction as “artificial” and “arbitrary.”56 Judge Rosenbaum remarks, 
“In the concurrence’s world, only the person who acts on her feelings 
enjoys the protection of Title VII. This makes no sense from a practi-
cal, textual, or doctrinal point of view.”57 He continues, “It cannot pos-
sibly be the case that a lesbian who is private about her sexuality . . . 
can be discriminated against by the employer because she does not 
comport with the employer’s view of what a woman should be, while 
the outwardly lesbian plaintiff enjoys Title VII protection.”58 
Judge Rosenbaum also disagrees with the notion that the Supreme 
Court has found a distinction between behavior and status in applying 
Title VII to proscriptive stereotyping sex discrimination. He reiterates, 
“The concurrence’s distinction between ‘behavior’ and ‘being’ is a 
construct that is both illusory in its defiance of logic and artificial in 
its lack of a legal basis.”59 
Judge Rosenbaum next addresses the concurrence’s seemingly 
defensive discussion of the various lifestyles gay individuals may 
choose. Yet, he explains, “The concurrence’s argument seems to fun-
damentally misunderstand what it means to be a lesbian. Lesbians are 
women who are sexually attracted to women. That’s not a stereotype; 
it’s a definition.”60 
 
 54. Id. at 1264. 
 55. Id. (citation omitted). 
 56. Id. at 1266. 
 57. Id. at 1267. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1268. 
 60. Id. at 1269. 
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Judge Rosenbaum likewise disposes with the majority’s Blum-
based reasoning because he believes it “directly conflict[s] with Price 
Waterhouse[].”61 He also criticizes the majority’s reliance on other 
circuits’ rulings—“the mere fact that our friends may jump off a bridge 
does not, in and of itself, make it a good idea for us to do so.”62 
Finally, Judge Rosenbaum cites several district court decisions 
that have reached the conclusion that sexual orientation discrimination 
is actionable under Title VII cases which the concurrence and majority 
failed to acknowledge.63 
IV.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII 
It is well established that Title VII prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against an employee because of his or her sex.64 How-
ever, sex was actually added to Title VII at the “last minute” and, 
“[a]ccordingly, the legislative history contains little discussion about 
what constitutes sex discrimination, leaving the definition open to ju-
dicial interpretation.”65 
For years, district and appellate courts have dealt with sexual ori-
entation claims under Title VII by frankly not dealing with them—that 
is, dismissing claims of sexual orientation as not actionable under Title 
VII.66 As a result of this long-standing unanimity, the Supreme Court 
has never explicitly addressed the question. However, the Supreme 
Court has issued a few opinions broadening the scope of protection 
provided by Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” clause.67 Below is a dis-
cussion of the relevant Supreme Court cases as they carve a path for 
recognizing sexual orientation discrimination as actionable under Title 
VII. 
 
 61. Id. at 1270 (first alteration in original). 
 62. Id. at 1271. 
 63. Id. at 1272–73. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). 
 65. Camille Patti, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the Battle but Winning the 
War for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 133, 
135 (2017). 
 66. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The law is well-settled in this circuit 
and in all others to have reached the question that Simonton has no cause of action under Title VII 
because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.”). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). 
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B.  Supreme Court Decisions 
In 1978, the Supreme Court held in City of Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Water & Power v. Manhart68 that generalizations about a class 
of individuals, even when true, do not justify discrimination against 
an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.69 In other 
words, “[i]f height is required for a job, a tall woman may not be re-
fused employment merely because, on the average, women are too 
short.”70 This holding recognized what the dissent in Evans called “as-
criptive stereotyping” as an avenue for setting forth a legally cogniza-
ble claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.71 
Just over ten years later in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court 
held that Title VII precluded not only sex discrimination based on an 
assumed gender stereotype regardless of whether the employee met 
the stereotype, but also discrimination based on failure to conform to 
a gender stereotype.72 The dissent in Evans referred to this form of 
stereotyping as “prescriptive.”73 The Court in Price Waterhouse main-
tained that “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individ-
uals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”74 
Additionally, in 1998, the Supreme Court held in Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc. that same-sex sexual harassment 
(when the alleged harasser and employee are of the same sex) is cog-
nizable as sex discrimination under Title VII.75 The dissent in Evans 
would have held that these rulings abrogated the Eleventh Circuit 
precedent relied on by the majority and concurrence. Regardless of 
whether or not the Supreme Court intended to lay the groundwork for 
recognizing sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII, 
courts have increasingly been using these cases to reach that exact 
conclusion. 
 
 68.  435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 69. Id. at 708. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.; Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rosenbaum, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
 72. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 73. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1262 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 
707 n.13). 
 75. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Evans is Moving in the Wrong Direction 
Judge Rosenbaum’s in-depth explanation of the legal significance 
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse is illuminating. 
Most informative of the scope of the Price Waterhouse holding is the 
Supreme Court’s finding that “[i]n forbidding employers to discrimi-
nate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women 
resulting from sex stereotypes.”76 
The dissent’s point of view in Evans is agreeable insofar as it 
seems to breathe life into the “entire spectrum” language in Price Wa-
terhouse.77 The Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary defines “ste-
reotype” as “an often unfair and untrue belief that many people have 
about all people or things with a particular characteristic.”78 The 
“characteristic” at issue here is gender; and indeed, stereotypes linked 
to gender run deeper than “all women like shopping” and “all men like 
football.” Societal notions of gender and sexual orientation are inex-
tricably linked. 
The crux of Judge Rosenbaum’s argument is this: many people 
share the belief that all men and women are (or should be) attracted to 
persons of the opposite sex; thus, when a person is attracted to another 
of the same sex, they are non-conforming to their respective gender 
stereotype of heterosexuality.79 Therefore, a person who discriminates 
against a person because he or she is attracted to someone of the same 
sex is necessarily discriminating against someone because he or she 
has failed to conform to the discriminator’s notions of who he or she 
should be attracted to based on his or her gender. 
Whether or not this logic is completely sound, Judge Rosenbaum 
is not alone in this thinking. In fact, this logic seems to be gaining 
traction in the courts. On July 15, 2015, the EEOC issued an adminis-
trative decision holding that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-
 
 76. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 
707 n.13). 
 77. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1263 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 78. MERRIAM-WEBSTER LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.learnersdictionary.com/defi-
nition/stereotype (last visited March 18, 2018). 
 79. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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based consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex discrimination under 
Title VII.”80 
Taking this logic as persuasive authority, several district courts 
and two appellate courts have followed suit, holding that sexual orien-
tation discrimination is inherently sex-based discrimination and there-
fore legally cognizable under Title VII.81 Although the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in Evans,82 the EEOC decision in Baldwin and wave 
of district court decisions to follow may eventually lead to a Supreme 
Court case on point.83 
B.  Predicting a Future Supreme Court Ruling on the Issue 
If the Supreme Court indeed grants certiorari in a Title VII case 
involving sexual orientation discrimination in the future, one naturally 
might wonder how such a case may fare. Indeed, if the current Su-
preme Court bench hears such a case, gay rights advocates may have 
cause for hope. 
The current makeup of the bench leaves Justice Kennedy as the 
swing vote.84 With the addition of Justice Neil Gorsuch—who has 
been recognized as ideologically similar to the late Justice Scalia—
Justice Kennedy once again finds himself the lone moderate on the 
 
 80. Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 (EEOC July 15, 2015). 
 81. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[S]exual orientation 
discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination under 
Title VII.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[D]iscrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”); Philpott v. New York, 
252 F. Supp. 3d 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Sexual orientation discrimination . . . is cognizable 
under Title VII.”); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm. v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F. 
Supp. 3d 834, 839 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (“Title VII’s ‘because of sex’ provision prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.”); Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1151 
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[C]laims of sexual orientation discrimination are gender stereotype or sex dis-
crimination claims covered by Title VII . . . .”). 
 82. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l 
Hosp., 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (mem.). 
 83. Patti, supra note 65, at 145 (“Given the changes in the social understanding of both sex 
and sexuality that the justices recognized in Obergefell, the Supreme Court should take the oppor-
tunity created by Hively to formally hold that Title VII protects victims of sexual orientation dis-
crimination.”); see generally Alex Swoyer, Supreme Court Declines to Settle Gay Rights Employ-
ment Discrimination, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/11/supreme-court-declines-settle-gay-rights-
employmen/ (“[O]ther cases will eventually force the justices to confront the thorny issue.”). 
 84. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gor-
such-supreme-court.html (“Justice Kennedy . . . continues to hold the crucial vote in many closely 
divided cases.”). 
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bench.85 So, with a Title VII sexual orientation discrimination case 
potentially on the horizon for the Supreme Court, and with Justice 
Kennedy still sitting in the proverbial “hot seat,” could the stage be set 
for another Romer v. Evans86 showdown? 
In Romer, Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in 
which the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado Consti-
tution—which “preclude[d] all legislative, executive, or judicial ac-
tion at any level of state or local government designed to protect . . . 
‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual [persons] . . .’”—as violating the 
equal protection clause.87 Despite sexual orientation being a non-sus-
pect classification subject to rational basis review, Justice Kennedy 
rejected the proffered purpose for the law as protecting landlords’ and 
employers’ religious objections to homosexuality.88 Instead, Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies ho-
mosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them 
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so 
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”89 
Justice Scalia, in an unsurprisingly pithy dissent, made his point 
clear: “This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the 
resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this 
institution are selected, pronouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homo-
sexuality is evil.”90 
Could this “landmark decision on the gay rights front”91 be an 
indication of how a Title VII sexual orientation discrimination case 
might play out? One can imagine Justice Gorsuch taking a position 
similar to Justice Scalia’s, given his Scalia-esque commitment “to fol-
lowing the original understanding of those who drafted and ratified the 
Constitution.”92 But the more difficult prediction comes in discerning 
whether Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion can really be taken as an 
indication of an ideological preference for broadening the scope of 
 
 85. Benjamin Bell, How Neil Gorsuch Could Affect the Supreme Court, ABC NEWS 
(April 10, 2017, 4:18 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/neil-gorsuch-affect-supreme-
court/story?id=46691852. 
 86.  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 87. Id. at 620. 
 88. Id. at 635. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 91. Tobin A. Sparling, The Odd Couple: How Justices Kennedy and Scalia, Together, Ad-
vanced Gay Rights in Romer v. Evans, 67 MERCER L. REV. 305, 307 (2016). 
 92. Liptak & Flegenheimer, supra note 84. 
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federal protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation. 
Although Justice Kennedy never explicitly framed his opinion as 
furthering a gay rights agenda,93 his willingness to strike down the 
amendment to the Colorado statute despite the Court’s previous ruling 
in Bowers v. Hardwick94 and in the face of highly deferential rational 
basis review indicates otherwise. Ultimately, however, there is no way 
to guarantee Romer déjà vu, especially since a Supreme Court decision 
on the Title VII issue may hang on the minutiae of the substantive Title 
VII jurisprudence discussed above as opposed to the policy-based 
equal protection analysis employed in Romer. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The majority and concurrence in Evans represent where courts 
have historically landed on the question of whether discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII. On the other 
hand, the dissent represents where courts seem to be headed on the 
same issue. With an emerging circuit split, the stage is set for the Su-
preme Court to end the debate. Although it is difficult to predict how 
such a case might turn out, it will no doubt be significant to both legal 
scholars and gay rights advocates alike. 
 
 
 93. Sparling, supra note 91, at 306–07. 
 94. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that a Georgia sodomy statute did not violate the fundamen-
tal rights of homosexuals). 
